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Abstract: Illusionism about phenomenal properties has the potential 
to leave us with all the benefit of taking consciousness seriously and 
far fewer problems than those accompanying phenomenal realism. 
The particular problem I explore here is an epistemological puzzle 
that leaves the phenomenal realist with a dilemma but causes no 
trouble for the illusionist: how can we account for false beliefs about 
our own phenomenal properties? If realism is true, facts about our 
phenomenal properties must hold independent of our beliefs about 
those properties, so mistaken phenomenal beliefs must always remain 
an open possibility. But there is no way to identify the phenomenal 
facts that make these beliefs false other than by mere stipulation. If 
illusionism is true, then the state of affairs regarding what a subject’s 
experience seems like is just the illusion itself; there are no further 
facts of the matter about which the subject might have mistaken 
beliefs, so the problem does not arise. 
Phenomenal realism, whether radical or conservative, appears to be 
the default position regarding conscious experience. Anything less 
than full-fledged realism seems to deny the existence of our subjective 
inner lives. But the proposal that Keith Frankish gives us here, a type 
of anti-realism he calls ‘illusionism’ about phenomenal properties, has 
the potential to leave us with all of the benefit of taking conscious 
experience seriously and much less of the unnecessary metaphysical 
and conceptual baggage that accompanies a realist interpretation of 
these properties. 
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 216 A.  ROSS 
In categorizing phenomenal properties as illusions, it is important to 
note that Frankish is not suggesting that our inner lives are any less 
rich than they seem to be. On the contrary, our conscious experience is 
exactly as rich as it seems to be, not because there are real phenom-
enal properties present in our experience but because being rich and 
full of feeling is precisely how our experience seems to us, how our 
introspective representational mechanisms present our experiences to 
us. Frankish takes issue with the characterization of a philosophical 
zombie — a creature physically identical to an ordinary human being 
— as something ‘with no inner life, whose experience is completely 
blindsighted’ (Frankish, this issue, p. 22). The ‘inner life’ of any 
creature whose introspective representational mechanisms present 
their experience as rich and full of feeling just is rich and full of 
feeling. According to Frankish, ‘having the kind of inner life we 
have… consists of having a form of introspective self-awareness that 
creates the illusion of a rich phenomenology’ (ibid.). If we take 
illusionism seriously, then there is no further question of whether we 
are accurately representing real (rather than ersatz or pseudo) 
phenomenal properties. Zombies are just as correct in their judgments 
about how their experience seems to them as their ordinary human 
counterparts. 
As difficult as it might be to come to terms with the idea that 
phenomenal consciousness is a type of illusion, the epistemological 
problems facing the phenomenal realist may actually outweigh those 
facing illusionism. As Frankish aptly notes, ‘we have no introspective 
way of checking the accuracy of our introspective representations, and 
so cannot rule out the possibility that they are non-veridical’ (p. 28). 
He mentions this in the context of an argument for taking illusionism 
seriously, but there are multiple ways in which our introspective 
representations could turn out to be non-veridical, and potentially the 
most complicated arise for realist views. If illusionism is correct, then 
our introspective representations are non-veridical in so far as we 
interpret them as representing real properties rather than mere 
‘intentional objects, or a sort of mental fiction’ (ibid.). If realism is 
correct, certain failures of representation must still be a possibility. 
However, the manner in which our introspective representations can 
turn out to be non-veridical is more complicated: while the existence 
of phenomenal properties would depend upon the existence of our 
conscious experience, if phenomenal properties are real then their 
nature is necessarily independent of our beliefs about our experience. 
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Those who admit phenomenal properties into their ontology 
encounter serious epistemic difficulties, regardless of whether their 
underlying metaphysics is physicalist or dualist. To use Frankish’s 
terms, both ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ phenomenal realists face 
challenging puzzles regarding our epistemic relation to the phenom-
enal properties of our experience. To be a realist about phenomenal 
properties one must be able to defend the possibility of a scenario in 
which a subject believes herself to have a conscious experience with a 
particular phenomenal character while she is actually having a con-
scious experience with a different phenomenal character. That is, sub-
jects must be able to genuinely hold mistaken beliefs about the content 
of their own conscious experience, about what it’s like to be them at 
that moment. Cases in which subjects are not closely attending to their 
experience, or in which they misremember previous experiences and 
make inaccurate comparisons between current conscious experiences 
and prior ones, are easy to conceive. But if phenomenal realism is 
true, then subjects must be able to make mistakes about the content of 
their conscious experiences even when they are attending carefully, 
and even when their beliefs only concern their current conscious 
experiences. If a property is real, there are objective facts about that 
property, which is to say that whatever is true about these properties 
will be true regardless of a subject’s beliefs about them. So a subject 
must be able to hold mistaken beliefs about the intrinsic (rather than 
relational) content of their occurrent conscious experience. Any treat-
ment of phenomenal properties that falls short of this will fail to 
qualify as genuine realism, and will rather be some sort of disguised 
illusionism. 
Constructing a scenario in which a subject believes herself to have a 
conscious experience with phenomenal character  (that is, a con-
scious experience that instantiates phenomenal property ) while she 
is actually having an experience with phenomenal character  is fairly 
difficult. Chalmers (2003) attempts to do so when discussing the 
epistemology of phenomenal belief, and examining the scenario he 
constructs will illuminate certain epistemological challenges facing 
the phenomenal realist, challenges an illusionist will be able to avoid. 
To provide a framework for conceptualizing phenomenal belief — 
beliefs about our own occurrent conscious experiences — Chalmers 
coins a set of technical terms. One is the notion of a direct phenom-
enal concept, a concept the subject deploys via introspection which 
‘by its nature picks out instances of an underlying demonstrated 
phenomenal quality’ (ibid., p. 242) or phenomenal property. When 
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Mary sees colour for the first time and has the thought, ‘Oh, so that’s 
what it’s like to see red’, the concept we could articulate as ‘what it’s 
like to see red’ which she deploys here is what Chalmers calls a 
‘direct phenomenal concept’.1 Direct phenomenal concepts partially 
constitute direct phenomenal beliefs, the kind of belief that ‘identifies 
the referent of that concept with the very demonstrated quality’ (ibid.), 
as Mary’s belief above identifies the demonstrated phenomenal 
quality (the referent of ‘that’) with the referent of the direct phenom-
enal concepts (‘what it’s like to see colour’). So a direct phenomenal 
belief is formed when a subject internally gestures towards an experi-
ence she is having at time t1 with an introspective token-demonstrative 
‘this (Q)… experience’, and this kind of belief lasts only as long as the 
subject attends to the experience.2 If phenomenal properties are real, 
whether they are ultimately physical or non-physical, it should be 
possible for subjects to hold direct phenomenal beliefs, since these 
beliefs, when justified and true, constitute our phenomenal knowl-
edge.3 And it is this sort of phenomenal belief that subjects must be 
able to hold in error, since the truthmaker for such a belief is not how 
a subject’s conscious experience seems to her but rather the facts 
about the phenomenal properties instantiated in her conscious 
                                                          
1  It would be more appropriate to characterize the direct phenomenal concept in Mary’s 
belief as ‘what it’s like to have this experience’ rather than ‘what it’s like to see red’, 
since characterizing it as a red experience introduces a relational element we are trying 
to avoid here, in particular a connection between the experience she is having and what 
she already knows about colour phenomena, in particular, that some stimuli evoke red 
responses. 
2  Since both direct phenomenal beliefs and direct phenomenal concepts last only as long 
as a subject attends to a particular experience, there are some views of concepts accord-
ing to which direct phenomenal concepts will not qualify as concepts, and will leave the 
status of Mary’s belief an open question. For example, per the definition of ‘concept’ 
from Prinz (2007) and Millikan (2000), for something to be a concept it must be re-
deployable; that is, it must be the kind of thing a subject can deploy on multiple 
occasions, as the content is determined or fixed only by similarities between various 
instances in which a subject is disposed to deploy the concept. So by merely attending 
to an experience a subject is having at time t1 and internally gesturing toward it with a 
introspective token-demonstrative ‘this (Q)… experience’, the subject will not have 
formed a phenomenal concept. On the Millikan/Prinz view, Q here cannot be a concept 
unless it can be reused to identify multiple instances of the same phenomenal state, and 
this would conflict with the stipulated definition of direct phenomenal concepts. 
3  While there is room in logical space for a position that embraces realism about phenom-
enal properties but rejects the possibility of phenomenal knowledge, such a position 
would lack any intuitive or philosophical appeal. 
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experience, which are at least conceptually if not metaphysically 
independent of her beliefs about the character of her experience. 
The ‘clear case’ of failed direct phenomenal belief that Chalmers 
(2003) attempts to provide is perhaps as close as one can come to 
presenting such a case, but it is far from obvious that it actually con-
stitutes a genuine case of this type. A direct phenomenal belief is only 
formed when a subject deploys a demonstrative phenomenal concept 
and a direct phenomenal concept ‘based in the same act of attention’ 
(ibid., p. 236) and lasts only as long as that act of attention. For a sub-
ject to successfully form a direct phenomenal belief, her demonstra-
tive phenomenal concept and direct phenomenal concept must be 
‘appropriately aligned’ (ibid.). A subject will attempt but fail to form a 
direct phenomenal belief (or will form a false direct phenomenal 
belief) in cases where her demonstrative act fails to pick out a 
referent. In such a case, a subject intends to attend to some phenom-
enal property instantiated in her phenomenal experience and (in so 
doing) to form a direct phenomenal concept of that property, but 
somehow fails in this attempt. Chalmers attributes this failure to a 
‘mismatch’ between the cognitive element of the demonstration and 
targeted experiential element, i.e. the phenomenal property. 
Chalmers’ example is the case of mildly-misfortunate Nancy, who 
attends to a coloured patch of her phenomenal field, acting cognitively 
as if to demonstrate a highly specific phenomenal shade. Nancy 
intends to attend to her phenomenal experience in such a way that she 
would demonstrate a patch of phenomenal colour; that is, the object of 
Nancy’s attention and intended demonstration — the patch of 
phenomenal colour — is a phenomenal property. But her demonstra-
tion fails, purportedly because the cognitive elements and targeted 
experiential elements of her attempted demonstration are ‘mis-
matched’. In Chalmers’ thought experiment, 
…Nancy has not attended sufficiently closely to notice that the patch 
has a nonuniform phenomenal color: let us say it is a veridical experi-
ence of a square colored with different shades of red on its left and right 
side… (ibid., p. 237) 
If we consider this scenario for a moment, we will see that there are at 
least two stipulated features of Nancy’s situation that make her ‘false 
belief’ seem plausible, both of which are suspect.4 First, the notion 
                                                          
4  We might choose to say that Nancy has failed to form a direct phenomenal belief, rather 
than attributing to her a full-fledged false belief. For our purposes here either 
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 220 A.  ROSS 
that Nancy’s phenomenal field could be differently shaded on its left 
and right side while she believes it to be uniformly coloured seems 
prima facie plausible when it is described as a veridical experience of 
something in the external world, the properties of which can be 
objectively confirmed. But we should ask what reason we have for 
positing that Nancy’s phenomenally conscious experience is a veridi-
cal representation of this multi-shaded square when this assertion 
conflicts with the subject’s own belief about how her phenomenal 
field seems to her. To Nancy, it seems as if her phenomenal field has a 
consistent colour throughout, and without any way to confirm the 
‘phenomenal facts’ regarding her conscious experience, to claim that 
the phenomenal content of her experience is anything other than how 
she takes it to be would be mere stipulation without support. Perhaps 
connecting the facts about Nancy’s phenomenal field to states of 
affairs in the external world could provide suitable support, but since 
we are concerned solely with her subjective phenomenal experience, 
any connection between her phenomenal field and the world it repre-
sents is irrelevant, as Chalmers subsequently seems to agree. A later 
version of this material appears in Chalmers (2010, chapters 8 and 9), 
which are a near reprint of Chalmers (2003). In his subsequent 
account of Nancy’s failed phenomenal belief, the qualifier ‘veridical’ 
is omitted from the description of the content of her phenomenal 
experience. Instead, the passage reads: ‘Let us say that she has an 
experience of a square colored with different shades of red on its left 
and right side’ (2010, p. 270). And rightly so, as the use of ‘veridical’ 
is unlicensed here, an unsupportable stipulation. But if the realist 
cannot appeal to the notion of ‘veridical representation’ to specify the 
content of Nancy’s experience, he loses the intuitively plausible 
grounds for his claim that the actual content of the subject’s phenom-
enal experience and her beliefs about her phenomenal experience are 
‘mismatched’. Her failure is left unexplained. 
Stipulating that Nancy’s beliefs about her experience do not 
accurately represent how her experience seems to her flies in the face 
of our intuitive conception of our relation to our own conscious 
experience, a problem the illusionist can easily avoid. If illusionism is 
true, a subject may still misjudge a current quasi-phenomenal red 
                                                                                                                  
interpretation would be adequate: Nancy has made an odd mistake in judgment regard-
ing the phenomenal properties present in her conscious experience, which has resulted 
in either a false belief or a failed attempt at forming such a belief. 
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experience as being identical to a past quasi-phenomenal red experi-
ence. But if Frankish is correct and there are no real phenomenal 
properties, then a subject’s judgments about how her current experi-
ences seem to her now (rather than how they relate to other experi-
ences) cannot fail to match some fact of the matter about the real 
phenomenal properties of her experience. The realist, however, must 
be willing to accept that a subject’s beliefs may always misrepresent 
the facts of the matter about their phenomenal experiences. He is 
committed to the notion that the facts about the phenomenal character 
of a subject’s conscious experience are set by facts about the real 
phenomenal properties instantiated in her experience, and part of what 
makes the view realism is that those facts are in no way determined by 
a subject’s beliefs about how her experience seems to her. Any view 
according to which the subject’s beliefs about the character of her 
conscious experience do play a role in determining the facts of the 
matter about her conscious experience is a non-realist, illusionist type 
of view. 
The second feature of this situation that makes Nancy’s false belief 
seem plausible is that Nancy is described as not attending closely to 
her experience. The only circumstance Chalmers acknowledges in 
which a subject can attempt but fail to form a direct phenomenal belief 
is when the subject is not adequately attending to her experience (see 
Chalmers, 2003). As Frankish points out (p. 30), a radical or anti-
physicalist realist may appeal to ‘acquaintance’ as our form of 
epistemic access to the phenomenal properties of our experience, so 
long as we are adequately attending to those properties (see Chalmers, 
1996, pp. 196–7; 2003, pp. 246–54). And, as Frankish notes, the 
acquaintance relation is no magic bullet, even for anti-physicalists, 
since we must mentally represent our phenomenal properties in order 
to think or talk about them, and the representational process is by its 
nature potentially fallible (p. 30). If phenomenal realism is true, then 
Nancy must be able to form the false belief that her phenomenal field 
is consistently coloured when it is actually non-uniform, regardless of 
how closely she is attending to her experience. Her belief represents 
the character of her conscious experience, it does not constitute the 
character of that experience, and representation always carries the 
possibility of misrepresentation. Even if we grant that there is some 
sort of certainty guaranteed by the acquaintance relation, this certainty 
will not transfer to our beliefs about the phenomenal character of our 
conscious experience. If phenomenal properties are real, we must be 
capable of making errors in our judgment about their nature regardless 
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of how closely we attend to the content of our experience. As long as 
the phenomenal and cognitive components of our mental states remain 
distinct (either conceptually or metaphysically), the cognitive effort 
we put forth in forming those beliefs will provide no guarantee that 
our beliefs will accurately represent the facts about our phenomenal 
properties. But to say that Nancy attends as closely as possible to the 
phenomenal character of her conscious experience and still forms 
false beliefs about it seems to leave us at an awkward distance from 
the content of our own experience, a distance that the phenomenal 
realist is committed to embracing. 
The phenomenal realist is burdened with the problem of finding a 
plausible way to answer the question of whether a subject’s phenom-
enal beliefs satisfy the criteria for phenomenal knowledge. Not all 
phenomenal beliefs will succeed here; there must be room for some 
phenomenal beliefs to turn out false. Hence the realist encounters a 
serious problem of one’s own mind. An illusionist has no such prob-
lem, and faces no analogous challenge; subjects hold phenomenal 
beliefs, but there is no further question of whether these beliefs fit the 
criteria for phenomenal knowledge, because according to the illusion-
ist phenomenal beliefs do not represent real properties — there is 
nothing against which their ‘accuracy’ can appropriately be measured. 
Phenomenal belief is the whole story, and there is nothing to be 
gained by searching for further ‘phenomenal facts’ nor by asking 
whether those beliefs amount to ‘phenomenal knowledge’. If the 
illusionist is correct, the answer to this question is ‘no’; there is no 
such thing as phenomenal knowledge in the sense advocated by the 
phenomenal realist. 
For the phenomenal realist, the standards against which phenomenal 
beliefs can be deemed true or false are set by phenomenal facts — 
facts about one’s own phenomenal states that are independent of one’s 
beliefs about those states. For the radical (anti-physicalist) realist, 
these facts will be independent of any physical facts about the subject. 
For the conservative realist, phenomenal facts will be a special subset 
of physical facts, but must still be (either conceptually or in actuality) 
independent of a subject’s phenomenal beliefs. As Frankish rightly 
points out, conservative realism balances on a knife edge, and if it 
turns out that, though we may have phenomenal beliefs (beliefs about 
how our experience seems to us), there is no such thing as an actual 
phenomenal fact, the conservative position will collapse into 
illusionism. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEMS  FACING  REALISM 223 
References 
Chalmers, D.J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D.J. (2003) The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief, in 
Smith, Q. & Jokic, A. (eds.) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, 
pp. 220–272, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D.J. (2010) The Character of Consciousness, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Millikan, R. (2000) On Clear and Confused Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Prinz, J. (2007) Mental pointing: Phenomenal knowledge without concepts, 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (9–10), pp. 184–211. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
